Abstract: Can rational communication proceed when interlocutors are uncertain which contents utterances contribute to discourse? An influential negative answer to this question is embodied in the Stalnakerian principle of uniformity, which requires speakers to produce only utterances that express the same content in every possibility treated as live for the purposes of the conversation. The principle of uniformity enjoys considerable intuitive plausibility and, moreover, seems to follow from platitudes about assertion; nevertheless, it has recently proven controversial. In what follows, I defend the principle by developing two arguments for it based on premises reflecting the central aims and assumptions of possibility-carving frameworks for modeling inquiry — that is, frameworks which describe the evolution of individuals’ attitudinal states in terms of set-theoretic operations defined over a domain of objects representing possibilities.
Abstract: Sceptical theists attempt to meet the challenge to theism posed by evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the limitations of human cognition. Drawing on an exchange between William Rowe and Michael Bergmann, I argue that consistent sceptical theists must be radically insensitive to certain kinds of evidence about prima facie evils – that is, that they must endorse the claim that not even evidence of extreme and pervasive suffering could justify disbelief in theism. I show that Bergmann’s attempt to respond to this problem does not succeed and argue that no alternative response is forthcoming, concluding that the threat of radical insensitivity constitutes a serious and underappreciated difficulty for sceptical theism.
Abstract: Greg Ray (2014) believes he has discovered a crucial oversight in Donald Davidson’s semantic programme, recognition of which paves the way for a novel approach to Davidsonian semantics. We disagree: Ray’s novel approach involves a tacit appeal to pre-existing semantic knowledge which vitiates its interest as a development of the Davidsonian programme.
The Structure of Truth. Forthcoming with Oxford University Press. (With Ernie Lepore.)
Abstract: Donald Davidson's 1970 Locke Lectures appear in print for the first time in this volume, accompanied by an introduction highlighting their significance as a snapshot of his evolving views in the philosophy of language and describing their relationship to the work he published during his lifetime. The lectures comprise an invaluable historical document that illuminates how Davidson was thinking about the theory of meaning, the role of a truth theory therein, the ontological commitments of a truth theory, the notion of logical form, and so on, at a pivotal moment in the development of his thought. Unlike Davidson’s previously published work, they are written so as to be presented to an audience as a fully organized and coherent exposition of his program in the philosophy of language. Had these lectures been widely available in the years following 1970, we believe the reception of Davidson’s work, especially in the philosophy of language, might have been very different. Given the systematic nature of their presentation of Davidson's semantic program, we also hope that they will be of use to those encountering his thought for the first time.
Works in Progress
(Drafts available on request)
"Slurs Are Directives" (Revise and Resubmit)
Summary: I propose a novel semantics for slurs.
"Why Horizontalism" (Revise and Resubmit)
Summary: I explore a novel strategy for adjudicating between the horizontalist and diagonalist theories of assertoric content by considering the advantages and disadvantages which would accrue to a linguistic community as a result of adopting different committal practices — that is, practices of associating utterances with the propositions to which speakers undertake assertoric commitments in uttering them — ultimately concluding that a horizontalist practice has important advantages over its competitors.
''Do Not Diagonalize''
Summary: I show that diagonalism — the thesis that a speaker always asserts some diagonal proposition of her utterance — conflicts with our intuitive judgments about the truth-value of what is asserted in a range of cases involving known information asymmetries between speaker and audience. I then show how a compelling argument for diagonalism can be constructed from the premise that the content of an assertion is the proposition on which the speaker and her interlocutors doxastically coordinate. The failure of diagonalism, then, requires that we reject this premise. I therefore suggest an alternative way of thinking about assertion, according to which the content of an assertion is the proposition to which a speaker undertakes a distinctive sort of commitment.
''Gaslighting in Axiology''
Summary: I begin by developing my a characterization of gaslighting which broadens the range of cases in which the term can be applied in a way that allows us to understand it as associated with a distinctive sort of harm toward its victims. I then explore one application of my favored view of gaslighting: that claim about what sorts of lives are good can constitute gaslighting. I illustrate this phenomenon with two examples drawn from the literature on axiology: first, the debate over whether certain disabled lives are as good as non-disabled lives; second, the question of whether sexual activity must be potentially procreative to contribute to human wellbeing.